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Outsourcing has become an important source of competitive advantage and it is expected to 
remain an important component of business strategy in future years (Broedner et al. 2009, Kroes 
and Ghosh 2010, Wee et al. 2010). In their comprehensive review of the outsourcing literature, 
Hatonen and Eriksson (2009) found a lack of investigation on effective management of existing 
outsourcing transactions. Considering that many outsourcing decisions lead to failures, it is vital 
that managers have a good understanding of what makes outsourcing effective. In particular, 
how can managers safeguard against uncertainties and opportunism typically associated with an 
inter-organizational transaction such as outsourcing? What governance mechanism can managers 
adopt to ensure that both the buyer and the supplier work together as intended to accomplish the 
outsourcing objective, enhancing manufacturing competitiveness?  
Outsourcing is essentially an inter-organizational business transaction. Conventionally, the 
formal governance mechanism of a business transaction is the contract. The contract is the 
foundation for the overall business transaction and it provides formal control of the interactions 
between the buyer and the supplier regarding their responsibilities and behaviors (Jiang et al. 
2008, Yao et al. 2010). Nonetheless, for various reasons, such as technology and market 
uncertainties, not all aspects of an inter-organizational transaction are likely to be completely 
detailed by the contract (Handley and Benton 2009). Consequently, additional control 
mechanism such as relational adaptation (buyer-supplier collaboration, joint problem solving, 
and information sharing) becomes necessary for settling contractual disputes and safeguarding 
completion of transactions (Narasimhan et al. 2010, Peterson et al. 2002, van Hoek 2000). For 
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instance, Monczka et al. (2008) suggested a buyer-supplier partnership could serve as “dispute 
prevention” to reduce dispute litigation resulting from contractual conflicts. Cooperative or 
relational adaptation is especially critical to business transactions in a global business 
environment where normal contractual guidelines may not account for cultural differences or 
anticipate all potential changes (Liu et al. 2009). Consequently, proper use of these two 
governance mechanisms (formal contractual clauses and informal relational adaptation) in 
accordance with the nature of business transactions is vital to the success of outsourcing. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has been suggested as a theoretical framework to 
determine an effective institutional structure (markets versus hierarchies) and associated 
governance mechanisms for supply chain transactions (Grover and Malhotra 2003, Vivek et al. 
2008; Williamson 2008). The primary purpose of TCE is to explain why transactions in certain 
institutional arrangements operate with different degrees of efficiency. TCE posits that the 
alignment of transaction attributes (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transaction, ease 
of performance assessment) and institutional structure leads to higher transactions efficiency. 
Previous supply chain studies have applied TCE to examine the choice and benefits of 
outsourcing (e.g., Houston and Johnson 2000, McNally and Griffin 2004). What is notably 
missing from the literature is an understanding of the operationalization of inter-organizational 
governance mechanism and the strategic influence of selected mechanisms (Houston and 
Johnson 2000). For instance, three transaction attributes (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency 
of transactions) that characterize the nature of transactions (Williamson 1979, 1999) are often 
used to predict the efficiency of outsourcing decisions. Nonetheless, the use of governance 
mechanisms, such as legal contractual clauses and relational adaptation (informal buyer-supplier 
cooperation), to mediate the effectiveness of outsourcing transactions has never been properly 
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studied. In particular, the central theme of TCE—how transactions are governed to achieve 
efficiency—is not fully addressed in the extant outsourcing research. As the trend and pressure of 
outsourcing continues (Hatonen and Eriksson 2009), an important question to ask is “How can 
existing transactions be more effective?” rather than “Should outsourcing be done?”.   
This study intends to extend the academic discussion of TCE and outsourcing to the selection 
and execution of governance mechanisms for effective outsourcing transactions. In reality, 
businesses need good legal contracts and buyer-supplier cooperation to manage “bounded 
rationality” in outsourcing (Liu et al. 2009, Monczka et al. 2008). We use contractual governance 
and relational adaptation as independent variables, as opposed to simply using transaction 
attributes, to predict the effectiveness of outsourcing as measured by manufacturing 
competitiveness. This approach allows for the development and testing of a TCE-based 
outsourcing model regarding the meditational effect of governance mechanisms. Therefore, in 
response to the call from the literature (Grover and Malhotra 2003, Williamson 2008), our 
objective is to provide a better understanding as to how firms follow up on their outsourcing 
decisions to enhance manufacturing competitiveness through the combined applications of 
contractual governance and relational adaptation. The relative efficacy of these two forms of 
governance is also examined. 
The following section reviews relevant literature to develop a TCE-based outsourcing model 
that depicts the relationship among key TCE variables including transaction attributes, 
governance mechanism, and manufacturing competitiveness. A number of research hypotheses 
are proposed, followed by a discussion of research methodology, including samples and 
measurements. The statistical results and discussion are presented and, finally, managerial 




2. Theoretical Development 
2.1 TCE and SCM 
The framework of TCE is frequently used to determine the proper governance structure of 
corporate transactions and what activities should be internalized versus purchased (Williamson 
2008). TCE argues that firms select the organizational structure with the lowest transaction cost 
that effectively safeguards against partner opportunism, ensures that partners fulfill contractual 
obligations, and provides a framework for dealing with uncertainties (Kogut 1988, Williamson 
1999). Market and hierarchies are two polar modes of institutional arrangements. The market-
mode features high-powered incentives, little administrative control, and a legal-rules contract 
law regime (Williamson 1979, 1985). In contrast, a fully integrated vertical structure, or 
hierarchy, applies low-powered incentives, considerable administrative control, and the courts 
are deferential to management. Business transactions often takes place in a hybrid mode, a 
compromise mode that is located between market and hierarchy arrangements regarding the level 
of control and the use of contract law regime. The viability of the hybrid approach may depend 
on the efficacy of the governance mechanisms employed in the transaction. Specifically, detailed 
and fixed contracts (with multiple clauses) and relational adaptation serve the purpose of 
safeguards (Peterson et al. 2002), which helps to avoid irrational and opportunistic behaviors and 
to offset the risks of dependencies resulting from transaction specificity.  
Summarizing from Williamson (1979, 1985), Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), and Peterson et 
al. (2002), Figure 1 displays a general TCE framework regarding the relationships among 
transaction attributes, institutional structure, hybrid forms of governance mechanism, and 
transaction effectiveness. Governance mechanism has two basic elements, contractual 
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governance and relational adaptation. When these two mechanisms are both implemented, it is 
referred as hybrid governance (Peterson et al. 2002). Overall, TCE proposes to choose the most 
efficient institutional structure supported by some sorts of governance mechanism and, hence, 
safeguards against opportunism and contributes to transaction effectiveness.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
The concept of TCE has long been discussed and applied in the fields of strategy, marketing, 
and organizational behavior. In the operations management area, the concept became popular 
with the advent of supply chain management research (Grover and Maholtra 2003, Hobbs 1996, 
Williamson 2008). Supply chain management is a form of vertical inter-organizational 
relationships. Any transactions between trading partners are managed without common 
ownership. Based on the concept of TCE, several studies defined a supply chain as a hybrid 
governance structure and, thereby, justified the outsourcing decision and verified the benefit of 
the decision. Table 1 is a list of selected literature pertinent to the application of the TCE 
framework for outsourcing decisions. Most literature either verified the benefits of outsourcing 
or demonstrated the choice of institutional structure (e.g., make-buy, joint action) based on 
transaction attributes. For instance, Poppo and Zenger (1998) identified business conditions 
when a joint action is the preferred inter-organizational structure. They found that asset 
specificity and performance ambiguity increase dependency between transaction parties and 
opportunism, which in turn discourages outsourcing. McNally and Griffin (2004) examined the 
effects of asset specificity, risk, and price emphasis in business transactions on the level of joint 
action. Rabinovich et al. (2007) found that asset specificity, environmental risk, and performance 
ambiguity decrease the degree of the reliance on logistic service providers. Verwaal et al. (2008) 
verified the negative effect of asset specificity and environmental risk on outsourcing.  
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<Insert Table 1 here> 
The literature review reveals one glaringly missing piece in the extant research regarding 
what makes an inter-organizational transaction like outsourcing effective. In light of the TCE 
framework in Figure 1, both institutional structure and governance mechanism should be aligned 
with transaction nature in order to achieve transaction effectiveness. To date, outsourcing studies 
have extensively examined the relationship between various transaction attributes and 
institutional structure (outsourcing or not). Nevertheless, the execution and effectiveness of 
different forms of governance mechanisms, such as legal contract and relational adaptation, have 
not been properly examined. Moreover, with few exceptions, most studies did not empirically 
verify the strategic benefits of outsourcing decisions (Kroes and Ghosh 2010). Consequently, a 
question is raised as to whether outsourcing automatically guarantees success even with perfectly 
matching transaction attributes (i.e., low levels of asset specificity and environmental risk, and 
high frequency of transactions). Additionally, what are the roles of popular governance 
mechanisms, such as contract and buyer-supplier collaboration, to the strategic implications of 
outsourcing? The extant literature does not offer satisfactory answers to these questions. The 
discussion of the relationships between transaction attributes and institutional structure along the 
market-hierarchy continuum is insufficient to describe/prescribe how hybrid governance 
enhances the effectiveness of transactions. Therefore, this study would contribute to the literature 
by addressing the research question: “How do firms make their outsourcing effective by 
choosing and executing hybrid forms of governance mechanisms to safeguard against 
opportunism to achieve manufacturing competitiveness?”  
 
2.2 Conceptual Model and Research Hypotheses 
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Figure 2 displays a conceptual model that hypothesizes the relationships among key TCE 
variables, including environmental risk (technological, behavioral, market), asset specificity 
(supplier investment), performance ambiguity (difficulty of measuring supplier performance), 
contractual governance, relational adaptation (buyer-supplier cooperation), and manufacturing 
competitiveness. The model addresses the research question of what makes an outsourcing 
decision effective. It considers two primary hybrid governance mechanisms (contractual 
governance and relational adaptation) as a function of asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
performance ambiguity (Rabinovich et al. 2007). Contractual governance safeguards 
opportunism by solidifying ex ante agreements with an exchange partner. In contrast, relational 
adaptation emphasizes coordination, joint problem solving, and information sharing to reduce 
opportunism since contracts may not be able to control all unforeseen factors (Peterson et al. 
2002, Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, Yao et al. 2010). Note that transaction frequency is not 
included as a transaction attribute since it is considered to be a less significant factor (Rindfleisch 
and Heide 1997). The research premise is, given an existing outsourcing transaction, that how 
well firms safeguard and adapt would subsequently influence the effectiveness of outsourcing as 
measured by manufacturing competitiveness. The remainder of this section uses this conceptual 
model to develop the related research hypotheses.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
The first transaction attribute in the model, asset specificity, refers to the transferability of 
investment that support a given transaction between a firm and the provider of a good or service 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, Williamson 1985). Joskow (1987) investigated the relationship 
between asset specificity and the length of contracts. When supplier asset specificity increases, 
the supplier is more vulnerable to holdup in future transactions because of dedicated assets. In 
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the meantime, the buyer is also vulnerable to holdup because of switching costs (Rabinovich et al. 
2007). In other words, transaction-specific investments give rise to a safeguarding problem and 
mechanisms must be provided to minimize the risk of subsequent opportunistic exploitation 
(Williamson 1985). As a result, when specificity increases, both sides may rely on establishing 
certain contract terms to reduce holdup risk (van Hoek 2000). On the other hand, specific 
investments would increase commitment to the relationship or the level of information 
interactions engaged in by buyers and suppliers (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Overall, there is 
general agreement that asset specificity is positively related to both contractual and relational 
adaptation (Heide and John 1990, 1992, Joskow 1987, Liu et al. 2009, Parkhe 1993). 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between supplier asset specificity and the use of 
contractual governance for safeguarding. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between supplier asset specificity and the use of 
relational adaptation for safeguarding. 
 
The second transaction attribute, environmental risk, results from unexpected variation in 
circumstances surrounding the transaction. It may include a lack of knowledge about demand, 
technology, behavior, or providers’ performance. Environmental risks are pervasive in all supply 
chains and have important effects on supplier governance (Buvik 1998, Ellram et al. 2008, 
Lockamy and McCormack, 2010). When aspects of transactions are highly uncertain, firms face 
adaptation and information processing problems. A buyer will face safeguarding costs, such as 
expenditures incurred in fully specifying in advance and continually adjusting to changes. To the 
extent the relevant contingencies are too numerous or unpredictable to be specified ex ante in a 
contract, an adaptation problem exists (Buvik 1998) and mechanisms must be put in place to 
permit adjustments to be made as events unfold. More precisely, a buyer could include certain 
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clauses in the contract to prevent its supplier from being opportunistic (Dahistrom and Nygaard 
1999, Jiang et al. 2008). Nonetheless, there are limits on the amount of uncertainty that can be 
managed through contractual clauses, and firms could choose to rely on coordination and 
information sharing to improve transaction effectiveness (Grover and Malhotra 2003, 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). In summary, environmental risks may be lessened by both 
contractual governance and relational adaptation, which supports the development of the 
following hypotheses.   
H3: There is a positive relationship between environmental risk and the use of contractual 
governance 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between environmental risk and the engagement of 
relational adaptation 
 
Another transaction attribute to be considered is performance ambiguity. The newness of 
technology may drive performance measurement complexity and ambiguity (Ellram et al., 2008). 
Conceptually, performance ambiguity encourages opportunistic behavior by both supplier and 
buyer. The supplier can take advantage of poor specifications and not fulfill important 
requirements (McIvor 2009, Stratman 2008). On the other hand, poor specifications can provide 
the buyer with the opportunity to claim that some specifications were implicit in the agreement. 
In either case, the governance mechanism is required to safeguard against the opportunism 
arising from performance ambiguity. In particular, as performance ambiguity increases, firms are 
less able to write complete incentive contracts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). To reduce the 
problem of opportunism, firms must rely not only on contractual terms, but also execute 
cooperation for safeguarding (Heide and Miner 1992, Houston and Johnson 2000). Therefore, 
the less exact the performance specifications, the greater the need for control and adaptation. 
Accordingly, we posit the following hypotheses. 
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H5: There is a positive relationship between newness of technology and performance 
measurement ambiguity 
 
H6: There is a positive relationship between performance measurement ambiguity and 
contractual governance 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between performance measurement ambiguity and 
relational adaptation 
 
Several studies have suggested that relational adaptation serves as a substitute for the 
enforcement of formal contracts and control (Nooteboom et al. 1997, Parkhe 1993). This study 
uses the likelihood that the contract clauses will be enforced as the presence of formal 
contractual governance. The informal agreement for sharing information and solving problems 
reduces the likelihood of enforcing contractual clauses for safeguarding. Moreover, both 
contractual governance and relational adaptation safeguard against uncertainties and 
opportunism, and thereby enhance outsourcing performance. Effective contracting practices 
could make outsourcing outcomes more predictable and mitigate the risks associated with 
opportunism (Jiang et al. 2008, Liu et al. 2009, Poppo and Zenger 2002). Better control and 
coordination provisions from contractual governance would then lead to better outsourcing 
performance (Thomas et al., 2009). Similarly, several studies asserted that information sharing 
and joint problem solving provide the necessary flexibility to curtail uncertainties and 
opportunism, which makes a firm more competitive (Dyer and Chu, 2003). 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) and Grover and Malhotra (2003) asserted most TCE studies 
failed to demonstrate TCE’s performance implications. Several studies (Hatonen and Eriksson 
2009, McIvor 2010, Kroes and Ghosh 2010) suggested that research should focus on the impact 
outsourcing has on a firm’s ability to compete. The performance criterion of TCE is often 
narrowly limited to just the costs and not the benefits from the transaction. The benefit of 
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outsourcing transactions is derived from the buyer better utilizing its resources, which leads to 
better competitiveness performance. Since the benefits are realized from the execution of the 
contract with the support of informal buyer-supplier cooperation, they are considered 
endogenous variables determined by the governance mechanism. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
that increases in the use of the contractual governance and relational adaptation will be positively 
related to overall competitive performance.  
H8: There is a negative relationship between relational adaptation and contractual safeguards 
 
H9: There is a positive relationship between contractual governance and manufacturing 
competitiveness performance 
 
H10: There is a positive relationship between relational adaptation and manufacturing 
competitiveness performance 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Data and Measures 
The data were gathered by the Global Manufacturing Research Group (GMRG).  GMRG is a 
multinational community of researchers studying the improvement of manufacturing practices 
worldwide (www.gmrg.org). The GMRG consists of leading international academic researchers 
from over twenty countries who developed the GMRG database survey instrument for use 
around the world. This survey facilitates a global comparison of the effectiveness of 
manufacturing practices (Whybark et al. 2009). Since 1985, the GMRG has conducted four 
rounds of worldwide surveys that have been utilized in many OM studies (Kull and Wacker 2010, 
Schmenner and Vastag, 2006, Schoenherr 2010). This study used data from the GMRG 4.0 
Sample with 969 cases from 17 countries and 22 industry classifications (Table 2). The data were 
collected during 2007 and 2010.  
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<insert Table 2 here> 
Seven sets of constructs and measures are developed to test the research hypotheses (Table 3). 
They are Asset Specificity (AS), Environmental Risk (ER), Performance Ambiguity (PA), 
Newness of Technology (NT), Contractual Governance (CG), Relational Adaptation (RA), and 
Manufacturing Competitiveness (MC). With the exceptions of Asset Specificity, Performance 
Ambiguity, and Newness of Technology, all other latent variables were measured by multiple 
items. The scale for ER assesses the level of uncertainty associated with the market, technology, 
and behaviorism. Technology risk is caused by failure of the purchased item to meet the 
requirements of either the buyer’s system or the buyer’s customer. Market risk is the failure of 
the purchased item to satisfy customer need.  Behavioral risk is the degree to which there is 
supplier opportunism. As suggested by (Rendfleisch and Heide 1997, p.42), these three risks are 
combined as indicator variables for the latent construct called environmental risk.  
<insert Table 3 here> 
The CG scale assesses the likelihood of including and enforcing contractual clauses to 
protect from termination, quality problems, and late delivery. It measures the probability that a 
violation of a contract clause will be enforced (Mesquita and Brush 2008). The RA scale 
measures the commitment both sides make to solving problems, remaining flexible in solving 
quality issues, sharing schedule information, and relying on implicit agreements to work out 
details not included in the formal contract (Heide and John 1990, 1992). AS measures the level 
of the supplier’s investment in physical assets and/or processes to meet the buyer’s unique needs 
(Rindfleish and Heide 1997). PA is the level of difficulty in precisely determining the supplier’s 
performance (Poppo and Zenger 1998). NT is the percentage of the supplier’s products 
developed by recent technology. Finally, the scale for MC has respondents rate their 
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competitiveness as compared to their major industry competitors (Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004). 
It captures the four main dimensions of manufacturing competitiveness: cost, quality, flexibility, 
and delivery. These four factors are incorporated to make a single competitiveness factor to 
simplify overall manufacturing competitiveness. The scale was verified by previous GMRG 
studies (Pagell et al. 2005, Whybark et al. 2009, Kull and Wacker 2010). 
3.2 Psychometric Properties 
All multiple-item variables were tested for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha and 
construct reliability. As shown in Table 3, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged from 0.73 to 
0.89, while the construct reliabilities ranged from 0.73 to 0.84. This indicated a high internal 
consistency of measurement indicators; hence, the reliability of each variable was ensured 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Since the multi-attributed variables are defined by the literature they 
have face validity. 
Next, convergent validity and discriminant validity were assessed. O’Leary-Kelly and 
Vokurka (1998) suggested that the use of CFA to assess convergent and discriminant validity is 
more powerful and requires fewer assumptions than the traditional MTMM (multi-trait multi-
method) matrix method. In the CFA model, each item was linked to its corresponding construct 
and the covariances among those constructs were freely estimated. The resulting model fit 
indices are χ2 (237) = 529.916, NFI = .92, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .054, which were better than the 
threshold values recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). Moreover, all of the factor loadings 
were greater than 0.50 and were statistically significant at p < .05. Overall the convergent 
validity and unidimensionality were validated (Hair et al. 1998). 
A discriminant validity test was performed to establish the distinction among the variables 
used in this study and can be supported if the average variance extracted (AVE) is larger than the 
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squared correlations between variables (Fornell and Larcker 1981). As shown in Table 4, all four 
pairs of the squared correlations were smaller than the AVE of the respective variables. Hence, 
discriminant validity is supported. 
<insert Table 4 here> 
 
4. SEM Analysis and Results 
4.1 Full and Partial Mediation Model 
Two control factors are included in the study, country and firm size (the total number of plant 
employees). We found no significant statistical relationship to performance variables. To fully 
understand the relationships among the transaction attribute variables (AS, ER, PA, governance 
mechanism (CG, RA), and performance (MC) in Figure 2, we examine two competing models, 
full and partial mediation, using structural equation modeling (SEM) with the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) technique. The difference between the full mediation and partial 
mediation models is that the latter adds the exogenous variables AS, ER, and PA to the former 
model as predictors of MC. The two models are nested and can be compared with a chi-square 
difference test with the null hypothesis that the three direct effects/paths between the exogenous 
variables and dependent variable are zero. The extant literature assumes that transaction 
attributes (AS, ER, PA) determine outsourcing effectiveness without considering the mediation 
effect of governance mechanism. Comparison of the two competing models helps in 
understanding the total effects of the transaction attributes with the incorporation of the indirect 
effects of governance mechanism (CG and RA).  
The SEM results of the full mediation model were presented in the first column of Table 5. 
The overall fit indices of the model are 2(122) = 545.49, RMSEA =.059; CFI = 0.92; NFI = 0.90; 
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GFI = .94, and they are within acceptable scope (Hu and Bentler, 1998), suggesting that the 
model was a good fit to the data.  
<insert Table 5 here> 
The statistical results lend support for H1and H2 that asset specificity (AS) increases the use 
of both contractual governance (CG) and relational adaptation (RA). Both CG and RA help to 
reduce irrational and opportunistic behaviors because of the dependencies resulting from 
transaction specificity. Our samples also rely on legal contracts to curtail early contract 
termination, late delivery, and poor quality performance due to environmental risk; thus, H3 is 
supported. This result verifies previous findings that detailed and fixed contracts (with multiple 
clauses) serve the purpose of safeguarding against opportunism from uncertainties (van Hoek, 
2000; Williamson, 2008). To our surprise, environmental risk has a significant negative 
relationship with buyer-supplier cooperation (RA). As such, H4 is not supported.  
As expected, newness of technology (NT) makes it difficult for the buyer to measure supplier 
performance (PA), supporting H5. Interestingly, performance ambiguity does not increase the 
use of contractual governance. Instead, our samples resort to informal and mutual cooperation to 
deal with problems from measurement ambiguity. H7 is supported but not H6. The results 
indicate that not all uncertainties can be detailed in the contract and informal adaptation is a 
necessary ingredient to deal with the gray areas of an outsourcing transaction.  
Another surprising finding is the non-significant relationship between relational adaptation 
and contractual governance; thus, H8 is not supported. Mutual trust and collaboration have no 
significant impact on the enforcement of contractual clauses for safeguarding. (As a side 
comment, the SEM analysis also failed to find the covariance between contractual governance 
and relational adaptation.) Finally, as expected, both contractual governance and relational 
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adaptation improve manufacturing competitiveness, supporting H9 and H10. Both governance 
mechanisms appear to have significant direct effects on performance, which implies that they 
could indirectly influence the effects of transaction attributes.   
Adding the direct links ASMC, Risk MC, and PA  MC to the full mediation model 
creates a partial mediation model with 2(119) = 529.77. The model specifications, goodness-of-fit 
statistics and path coefficients of the partial mediation model are also summarized in Table 6. All 
the fit indices and the significance of paths are virtually identical with the first model. Both 
models provide the same results for all research hypotheses. However, the 2 difference (2 (3) = 
545.49 – 529.77 = 15.72) between the two models is statistically significant (the critical 2(3) 
value is 11.3 for p < .01). Accordingly, we reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that not all 
direct effect paths between exogenous variables and manufacturing competitiveness are zero. 
Therefore, the second model (partial mediation) is a better fitting model to describe the 
relationships among all variables. A schematic representation of the final structural model with 
standardized path coefficients is displayed in Figure 3.  
<insert Figure 3 here> 
In summary, of 13 causal paths (10 specified in the research hypotheses) in the partial 
mediation model, nine were found to be statistically significant. The path ER  MC that was not 
specified a priori proved to be an essential component of the causal structure. The negative 
coefficient (–.18) suggests that a higher degree of uncertainties from market, technology, and 
behaviorism reduce the level of manufacturing competitiveness. Asset specificity and 
performance ambiguity have non-significant direct effects and minimal influences on 
manufacturing competitiveness. Nonetheless, their total effects, after consideration of indirect 
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effects from the CG and RA, reveal interesting findings. The remainder of this section discusses 
the mediation effect of CG and RA. 
4.2 Mediation Effect of Governance Mechanism 
A validated partial mediation model allows us to make an in-depth analysis of direct and indirect 
effects of transaction attributes on performance. Such an analysis is valuable since previous 
studies primarily focused on the direct effects of transaction attribute, but not their indirect 
effects through the choice and execution of contractual governance and relational adaptation.  
Table 6 summarizes the total and indirect effects of the transaction attributes AS, ER, and PA. 
Their total effects on manufacturing competitiveness (MC) are greater than their direct effects. In 
other words, their indirect effects from the execution of contract and cooperation display positive 
influences on transaction performance. For instance, the direct effect of AS on MC is .03 (non-
significant). Nonetheless, AS increases the use of contractual governance (standardized 
coefficient = .27) and relational adaptation (.26), and both have positive influence on 
competitiveness (.21 and .13). The indirect effect of asset specificity from both contract and 
cooperation is .10 (p < .01), which in turn increases the total effect to .13 (.03 + .10, p < .01). 
Therefore, the governance mechanism, CG and RA, is essentially a full mediator for the impact 
of AS on MC. In other words, while asset specificity itself does not have significant influence on 
manufacturing competitiveness, the practices of contractual governance and relational adaptation 
indirectly and significantly enhance the effects of asset specificity on transaction performance.  
<insert Table 6 here> 
 
Similar observations were made from the other two exogenous variables. The negative effect 
of environmental risk was reduced from –.18 to –.16 (both are significant at p < .01) with the 
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indirect effect of .02 from governance mechanism. The influence of performance measurement 
ambiguity on manufacturing competitiveness turns positive (from –.03 to .05 with p < .05), after 
incorporating its indirect effect from governance mechanism. It appears that governance 
mechanism significantly mitigates opportunism problems arising from the difficulties of 
assessing supplier performance. Overall, the indirect effect that all transaction attributes 
received from contractual governance and relational adaptation help to improve their 
influence (total effects) on manufacturing competitiveness. Evidently, governance mechanism 
mediates the effectiveness of outsourcing transactions.  
5. Discussion 
Previous TCE studies primarily consider transaction attributes to determine whether outsourcing 
should be done. Our statistical results reveal that, among three transaction attributes, 
environmental risk is the only factor that has significant direct influence on outsourcing 
performance, measured as manufacturing competitiveness. Nonetheless, governance mechanism, 
contractual governance and relational adaptation, mediates the effect of all three transaction 
attributes. In general, both contractual governance and relational adaptation seem to provide 
effective safeguards against risk, asset specificity, and performance ambiguity, which ultimately 
lead to greater competitiveness. Taken together, the results indicate that it is insufficient to 
review outsourcing decisions by merely examining transaction attributes without considering the 
meditational effects of governance mechanism.  
While the governance mechanism has significant mediation effect, we found that, with the 
exception of asset specificity, contractual governance and relational adaptation are not equally 
effective to safeguard against opportunism. Trading parties actively engage in both contractual 
clauses and informal cooperation to protect special supplier investment. Nonetheless, our sample 
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firms rely on informal agreements and mutual trust, rather than legal contracts, to deal with 
measurement difficulties. This is consistent with previous studies arguing that legal contracts 
cannot address all uncertainties (e.g., Handley and Benton 2009).  
Meanwhile, our samples choose to increase contractual governance but not buyer-supplier 
cooperation to safeguard against environmental risk. In fact, they even reduce the level of 
relational adaptation in response to increased risk (-.13 at Risk  RA). That could be a reaction 
where, as risk increases, there is more distrust (possibly due to the blame for uncertainties) 
causing less informal cooperation. During a post-survey interview, a plant manager in China 
expressed his disappointment with how his supplier, without prior discussion, postponed a 
delivery due to the upstream material shortage. Disgusted by the supplier’s action, the plant 
manager called off several meetings and reduced the level of interaction with the supplier. It 
appears when a supplier exhibits that type of behavior, distrust develops and the buyer may 
choose to curtail informal cooperation and simply rely on formal contracts to manage the 
outsourcing. Regardless of the real causes of the reduced relational adaptation, our results 
suggest that firms are missing a great opportunity for improving transaction effectiveness.  
6. Conclusions 
There is ample evidence indicating that the trend of outsourcing will continue and managers 
must understand what make their outsourcing transactions effective (Hatonen and Eriksson 2009, 
Kroes and Ghosh 2010, Wee et al. 2010). What would really interest managers the most from a 
research perspective is “Why do some succeed and other fall in their outsourcing endeavors?” 
(Hatonen and Eriksson 2009, p. 149). The outsourcing decision must go beyond make-or-buy 
and address the “how” question in terms of making outsourcing transactions successful. 
21 
 
Accordingly, we identified two specific hybrid mechanisms, legal contract and informal 
adaptation, along which an outsourcing transaction is structured. We developed and validated a 
TCE-based outsourcing model that depicts the relationships among key TCE variables. The 
results suggest that manufacturing firms rely on both types of governance mechanisms to 
safeguard against special investment, risk, and performance ambiguity, which lead to 
manufacturing competitiveness.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature by confirming the mediation effects of 
governance mechanisms, a very important aspect of outsourcing transactions that has not been 
properly examined. Apparently, the indirect effects of contractual governance and relational 
adaptation can “make outsourcing effective.”  For outsourcing to be a viable strategy, firms must 
apply both mechanisms properly in alignment with the nature of transaction and environmental 
conditions. The important managerial and research implication is that it is insufficient to merely 
discuss the relationships among the attributes of transaction and governance structure along the 
market-hierarchy continuum. Such discussion fails to recognize how various forms of hybrid 
governance mechanisms can be implemented to enhance the effectiveness of transactions. 
Our results offer valuable suggestions to outsourcing practices. Managers must recognize the 
relative efficacy and the contingency of the two forms of governance, contractual clauses and 
buyer-supplier cooperation. Contractual governance was found to be very effective for mitigating 
the risk from market, technology, behaviorism and special investment. A contract is a critical 
juncture for determining the success of a commercial relationship. In light of the growth of 
global sourcing, outsourcing involves multiple jurisdictions with an inconsistent legal framework. 





However, the managers must realize the limitations of using legal contract as a governance 
mechanism. Namely, not all performance measurement difficulties resulted from the use of new 
technology can be addressed by contractual clauses. Firms must engage in relational adaptation 
to become flexible when facing performance ambiguity. This finding responds to and validates 
the call from the literature (Nooteboom et al. 1997, Grover and Malhotra 2003) for more studies 
on the issue of trust and social norms in TCE and inter-organizational transaction research. Our 
results suggest managers must engage in the practice of “transformational outsourcing” within 
which supply chain partners work closely to develop network competence, and the 
organizational boundaries between buyers and suppliers fade (Hatonen and Eriksson, 2009). The 
development of informal buyer-supplier collaboration is especially critical for the manufacturing 
from western world to engage in outsourcing in some Asian countries such as China, Korea, and 
Japan (Liu et al. 2009).  
Another important research implication is regarding the structure of inter-firm relationships 
for outsourcing management. Outsourcing implies a generic departure from market and an 
implicit move toward hierarchical governance. Heide (1994) suggested that nonmarket 
governance cannot be described by a single continuum, and we show that outsourcing can be 
structured and governed by the combination of different forms of governance mechanisms. This 
study examines only two particular mechanisms, contract and relational adaptation. Exploring 
other specific safeguards in response to transaction attributes or a particular environment should 
be a fruitful avenue for future research. Specifically, the relative efficiency of various hybrid 
governance mechanisms (e.g., supplier selection, supply base rationalization) in addressing 
particular opportunistic problems associated with outsourcing should be further studied.  
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There should always be a caveat regarding the bounded rationality of the limited factors that 
are considered in any empirical study. There are many factors beyond the current investigation 
that may affect the statistical results. For example, national differences influence supply chain 
and outsourcing decisions (Pagell et al. 2005, Schoenherr 2010) and how such differences affect 
the institutional structure of outsourcing transactions and effectiveness of various governance 
mechanisms needs to be studied (Liu et al. 2009, Youngdahl et al. 2008). It is also unknown how 
much industry differences affect the selection and execution of governance mechanism (Rosen et 
al. 2001, Hartland et al. 2005). In any case, the TCE governance framework presented in this 
study provides a guideline for a more incisive analysis of how firms govern suppliers to control 
opportunism. In future studies, more factors can be studied to provide specific guidelines for 
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Table 1. Selected TCE-based outsourcing literature 








Levy, 1985 Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER) 
Vertical integration AS and ER increased 
vertical integration 
John and Weitz, 1988 Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER) 
Percentage of direct 
channel (DC) 
AS and ER increased 
percentage of DC 
Heide and John, 1990 
 
Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER), 
Performance ambiguity (PA) 
Joint action AS, ER and PA increased 
Joint action  
Masten et al., 1991 Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER) 
Outsourcing AS and ER decrease 
outsourcing 
Maltz, 1994 Asset specificity (AS), 
Transaction frequency (TF) 
Probability of outsourcing AS decreased outsourcing; 
TF increased outsourcing 
Poppo and Zenger, 
1998 
Asset specificity (AS), 
Performance ambiguity (PA) 
Outsourcing AS and PA discouraged 
outsourcing 
van Hoek, 2000 Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER), 
Performance ambiguity (PA) 
Details of Contract clause AS and PA increased 
contract details 
McNally and Griffin, 
2004 
Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER) 
Joint action AS and ER discouraged 
joint action 
Rabinovich et al., 2007  
 
Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER), 
performance ambiguity (PA) 
Reliance on service 
provider (Percentage of 
orders managed by a 
provider) 
AS, ER and PA decreased 
reliance 
Verwaal et al., 2008 Asset specificity (AS), 
Environmental risk (ER) 





Table 2. Samples 
(a) Country distribution 
Country Frequency Country Frequency 
(1) Albania 15 (11) South Korea 115 
(2) Australia 30 (12) Macedonia 39 
(3) Austria 17 (13) Mexico 105 
(4) China 57 (14) Poland 57 
(5) Croatia 82 (15) Sweden 32 
(6) Fiji 110 (16) Switzerland 31 
(7) Germany 59 (17) Taiwan 50 
(8) Ghana 63 Total 969 
(9) Hungary 53 
(10) Italy 54 
 
(b) Industry distribution 
Industry Freq. Percent Industry Freq. Percent 
Electronic and other Equipment 124 12.8% Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi trailers 
18 1.9% 
Industrial machines and computer 
equipment 
116 12.0% Other manufactured transport 
equipment 
16 1.6% 
Fabricated metal  115 11.9% Apparel and Other finished 
Products 
13 1.3% 
Food Products GMP 60 6.3% Lumber and wood products 12 1.2% 
Textile Mill Products  37 3.8% Leather and other products 8 0.8% 
Stone clay glass and concrete 
products 
33 3.3% Primary metal industries  8 0.8% 
Furniture and fixtures  30 3.1% Petroleum refining and related 
products 
5 0.5% 
Rubber and Plastic products 30 3.1% Recycling   2 0.2% 
Chemical and allied products 25 2.6% Miscellaneous Manufacturing 258 26.7% 
Measuring analyzing and control 
photographic, medical equipment 
23 2.3% Total 969 100.0% 
Paper and allied products 18 1.9% 














1. Asset Specificity (AS)  Physical asset investment (OU11I) --- --- --- 
2. Risk/Uncertainty (R) 
(1=No risk, 7=Extremely 
risky) 
 Technology risk associated with this 
supplier’s products 
0.66 0.7279 0.7287 
 Behavioral risk associated with the 
attitudes of this supplier 
0.73 
 Market Risk associated with the 





 Easy to determine the performance of 
this supplier (OU11B) 
--- --- --- 
4. Newness of 
Technology 
 (%) supplier products tech developed 
recently (OU9D) 
--- --- --- 




 There is a standard approach when 
solving a problem with this supplier 
0.72 
0.8505 0.8425 
 This supplier and my firm are 
committed to relationship of mutual 
respect, that is, we do not  alter facts to 
own advantage 
0.73 
 This supplier and my firm are 
committed to flexibility when solving 
performance problems 
0.75 
 This supplier and my firm rely on 
‘implicit agreements’ for exchange 
contingencies not covered by ‘formal 
written agreements’ 
0.76 
 This supplier and my firm are 
committed to working out details after 




(The likelihood such 
clauses may be legally 
enforced: 1 = Clause does 
not exist; 7-extremely 
likely.) 
 Financial repayment if contract is 
terminated prior to its ending date 
0.68 0.7925 0.801 
 Exclusivity clause (that is, are you an 
exclusive supplier by contract?) 
0.51 
 Damage for poor technical performance 0.80 
 Damage for late delivery 0.82 
7. Manufacturing 
Competitiveness (MC) 
(How does your plant’s 
performance compare 
with your major 
competitors?  1=Far 
worse, 7=Far better) 
 Manufacturing costs  0.59 0.8875 0.8360 
 Product costs  
 Raw material costs  
 Product features  0.68 
 Product performance  
 Product quality  
 Order fulfillment speed  0.77 
 Delivery speed  
 Delivery as promised  
 Delivery flexibility  0.78 
 Flexibility to change output volume  
 Flexibility to change product mix  
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Table 4. Discriminant validity analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Manufacturing 
Competitiveness 
(0.503)       
2. Contractual Governance  0.200  (0.509)      
3. Cooperative Adaptation -0.077  -0.104  (0.518)     
4. Performance Ambiguity -0.095  -0.102   0.343  (---)    
5. Asset Specificity -0.022   0.236   0.071  -0.025  (---)   
6. Environmental Risk -0.115   0.116   0.110   0.216   0.041  (0.472)  
7. Newness of Technology -0.079   0.025  -0.029  -0.086  -0.023   0.021  (---) 




Table 5. SEM results 
 
Path (Hypothesis) 
Full Mediation Partial Mediation 
Std. parameter 
estimate (t-value) 
Significance Std. parameter 
estimate (t-value) 
Significance 
AS  CG (H1) .27 (6.03) Supported ** .27 (6.06) Supported ** 
AS  RA (H2) .27 (6.37) Supported ** .26 (6.25) Supported ** 
Risk  CG (H3) .15 (3.21) Supported ** .16 (3.43) Supported ** 
Risk  RA (H4) -.15 (-3.06) Not supported ** -.13 (-2.64) Not supported ** 
NT  PA (H5) .09 (2.69) Supported ** .09 (2.69) Supported ** 
PA  CG (H6) .03 (.53) Not supported .03 (.63) Not supported 
PA  RA (H7) .49 (10.33) Supported ** .49 (10.42) Supported ** 
RA  CG (H8) .12 (1.84) Not supported .12 (1.83) Not supported 
CG  MC (H9) .18 (4.19) Supported ** .23 (4.52) Supported ** 
RA  MC (H10) .18 (3.84) Supported * .13 (2.03) Supported * 
AS  MC (added)   .03 (.80) Insignificant  
Risk  MC (added)   -.18 (-3.87) Significant** 




Chi-square/df = 545.49/122, RMSEA 
=.059 (0.054 ; 0.065); CFI = 0.92; NFI 
= 0.90; GFI = .94 
Chi-square/df = 529.77/119, RMSEA 
=.059 (0.054 ; 0.064); CFI = 0.92; NFI 
= 0.91; GFI = .94 




Table 6. Analysis of total and indirect effects of transaction attributes 











AS  MC .13** .03 .10** = [.27 + .26(.12)](.21) + .26(.13)  
Decomposition 
CG: AS CGMC & ASRACGMC; 
RA: ASRAMC 
Risk  MC -.16** -.18** .02 = [.16 + (.13)(.12)](.21) + (-.13)(.13) 
Decomposition 
CG: Risk CGMC & 
RiskRACGMC RA: RiskRAMC 
&) 
PA  MC .05 -.03 .08** =[.03+.49(.12)](.21) + .49(.13)  
Decomposition 
CG: PA CGMC & PARACGMC 
RA: PARAMC 
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Transaction Attributes & 
Environmental Conditions  
 Asset specificity, performance 
ambiguity, environmental risk, 
transaction frequency 
 Institutional Arrangement 
(Market, Hierarchy, Hybrid)  
 Governance Mechanism 


















































* p <.05; ** p<.01 
Note:  
(a) Dashed arrows denote path for which coefficients are not significant at the .05 level. 
(b) For the revised model excluding insignificant paths, Chi-square/df = 532.41/123, RMSEA =.059 
(0.054; 0.064); CFI = 0.92; NFI = 0.91; GFI = .94 
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